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Executive Summary 
As the Awami League (AL) government’s political rivalry with the Bangladesh Na-
tional Party (BNP) reaches new heights, so has its repression. At the same time, a 
deeply politicised, dysfunctional criminal justice system is undermining rather than 
buttressing the rule of law. Heavy-handed measures are denting the government’s 
legitimacy and, by provoking violent counter-responses, benefitting violent party 
wings and extremist groups alike. The government needs to recognise that it is in its 
interest to change course, lest it fail to either contain violent extremism or counter 
political threats. A key part of a more prudent course would be to depoliticise and 
strengthen all aspects of the criminal justice system, including the judiciary, so it can 
address the country’s myriad law and order challenges and help stall a democratic 
collapse.  
The political conflict between the AL and BNP has resulted in high levels of vio-
lence and a brutal state response. The government’s excesses against political oppo-
nents and critics include enforced disappearances, torture and extra-judicial killings. 
Police tasked with targeting the government’s rivals and an overstretched justice sys-
tem compelled to prosecute opposition leaders and activists now also face a renewed 
threat from violent extremists. The permissive legal environment, however, is creat-
ing opportunities for extremist outfits to regroup, manifested in the killings of secular 
bloggers and foreigners and attacks on sectarian and religious minorities in 2015. 
The government’s reaction to rising extremism, including arrest and prosecution of 
several suspects without due process and transparency, is fuelling alienation that 
these groups can further exploit. 
Reconciling with the opposition and hence stabilising the state requires both 
political compromises and an end to the repressive use of law enforcement agencies 
and abuse of the courts. Politicising the police and using elite forces, particularly 
the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), to silence political dissent, are laying the seeds of 
future violence. By concentrating on targeting the opposition, the police are failing to 
curb criminality; the prisons are overburdened by the mass arrests of opposition 
leaders and activists; and the judiciary, perceived as partisan for trials and sentences 
based on political grounds, is losing credibility. The result is a justice system that 
swings between two extremes: woefully slow and dysfunctional for ordinary cases and 
speedy, undermining due process, in politically charged ones. 
Any effort to reform a dysfunctional criminal justice system, including by invest-
ing in training, equipping and otherwise modernising the police, prosecution and 
judiciary, will be insufficient unless it is also taken out of politics. Years of partisan 
recruitment, promotions and postings have polarised these institutions to the point 
that officials no longer conceal their allegiances. Partisanship tends to determine the 
kinds of complaints and cases that get filed and prioritised and even informs verdicts 
and sentences. 
The problems surrounding delivery of justice are further compounded by legal 
mechanisms to silence civil society and prevent media scrutiny and parallel processes 
that undermine due process in politically charged cases. The deeply flawed Interna-
tional Crimes Tribunal (ICT), established in 2010 to prosecute individuals responsible 
for atrocities committed during the 1971 liberation war, is an important example of 
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the dangers of using rule of law institutions for political ends. Perceptions of injustice 
are creating opportunities for extremist groups and fuelling political conflict.  
The BNP and its Jamaat-e-Islami ally marked the anniversary of the disputed 
2014 elections with indiscriminately violent strikes and traffic blockades, which were 
matched brutally by the state. The BNP now appears less willing to resort to violence 
to unseat the government; its decision to re-enter the political mainstream gives the 
government an opportunity it should exploit by urgently resuming dialogue with the 
opposition. To demonstrate sincerity and as a first step, it should end use of the rule 
of law institutions to target opponents and silence critics. Accepting legitimate ave-
nues of participation and dissent would also help regain some lost legitimacy and the 
trust of citizens in the state’s provision of both justice and security. So long as there 
is no independent court system to arbitrate disputes fairly, the parties are likely to 
continue taking those disputes to the streets, but a neutral judiciary could help defuse 
tensions by upholding fundamental principles and preventing executive excesses. 
The international community can help to promote political reconciliation by, in the 
U.S. and EU case, using economic levers to pressure Dhaka to respect civil and politi-
cal rights, and in New Delhi’s by using close ties to urge the AL to allow the opposition 
legitimate political expression and participation. There is no time to lose. If main-
stream dissent remains closed, more and more government opponents may come to 
view violence and violent groups as their only recourse.  
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Recommendations 
To restore political stability and ensure security 
To the Government of Bangladesh: 
1. Commit to accepting legitimate political opposition and dissent, including by 
ending use of the criminal justice system to target political critics; and respond 
positively to the BNP’s decision to refrain from violence and re-enter the politi-
cal and constitutional mainstream through participation in the electoral process 
by reopening urgently a dialogue to end the destabilising political stalemate. 
To the Opposition: 
2. Commit to peaceful opposition, including by preventing party activists from using 
violence to subvert the political order; and sever ties with political allies who use 
violence to destabilise the government.  
To the Higher Judiciary: 
3. Develop consistent judicial doctrine/interpretation upholding the right to a fair 
trial and restraining the executive branch from undermining fundamental consti-
tutional rights and principles, including actions against civil society institutions 
that undermine their ability to function freely. 
To respect the constitutional right to free speech and dissent 
To the Government of Bangladesh: 
4. Withdraw all cases against journalists, human rights groups and other civil soci-
ety actors that are based on vague and dubious grounds, such as expressing views 
deemed “derogatory” of public officials or against the “public interest”, and end 
press closures and raids on media offices. 
5. Withdraw the 2014 national broadcast policy and remove restrictions on online 
expression in the Information and Technology Act. 
To the Higher Judiciary: 
6. Refrain from issuing contempt of court citations to media and other civil society 
representatives for criticising court judgments, and overturn unjustified contempt 
convictions in other courts, including the International Crimes Tribunal. 
To ensure due process and end political interference in the justice system 
To the Government of Bangladesh: 
7. Enforce the constitutional requirement for an independent judiciary by establish-
ing a more transparent, consultative appointment process, including consultations 
with the bar councils and parliamentary endorsement. 
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8. Avoid statements alleging the identity of those responsible for crimes while inves-
tigations are ongoing; and end the practice of presenting suspects to the media, 
rather than in court, as required by the constitution. 
To the Higher Judiciary: 
9. Issue clear orders against any executive bodies or officials found to be interfering 
in the judicial process. 
10. Insist on the need for an adequately resourced and staffed Supreme Court secre-
tariat as fundamental to achieving judicial independence; provide the neces-
sary resources to and scrutinise the workings of the lower judiciary; and hold to 
account judges who fail to provide a fair trial. 
To modernise the criminal justice system 
To the Government of Bangladesh:   
11. Introduce amendments to adapt the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, Evidence 
Act 1872, Police Act 1861, Penal Code 1860 and the Jail Code to modern challeng-
es, including by implementing Bangladesh Law Commission recommendations 
on increasing use of technology and forensic and other modern evidentiary 
standards in investigations and trials.  
12. Professionalise the police, prosecution agencies and lower judiciary, including by 
introducing a merit-based selection and recruitment process, secure tenure and 
effective mechanisms to evaluate performance and check political interference.  
13. Identify personnel, training and resource needs particularly for the Police Bureau 
of Investigation, while developing specialised investigation units for national- and 
district-level policing.  
To push for a broader political reform agenda 
To the International Community:  
14. Link some development assistance, and in the U.S. case the restoration of the 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) facility, to demonstrable improvements 
in human rights, free speech and association and fair trial.  
15. Use, in the case of India, its close relationship with the AL to urge the govern-
ment to allow legitimate avenues of political expression and participation to the 
opposition. 
Brussels, 11 April 2016 
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Political Conflict, Extremism and Criminal 
Justice in Bangladesh 
I. Introduction 
Bangladesh’s law enforcement and judicial system is tasked with suppressing the 
Awami League (AL) government’s political rivals, while also countering criminality 
and violent extremism. Over-stretched, it is failing both to enforce the law and to 
stabilise the polity. Current law and order challenges are largely rooted in the in-
tense rivalry between the government and its political opposition, the Bangladesh 
Nationalist Party (BNP) and its Jamaat-e-Islami ally. A resurgent extremist threat, 
symbolised by the killing of secular bloggers and foreigners and attacks on religious 
minorities in 2015 and in April 2016, adds to the security challenges.1  
Despite relative peace on the streets, the country has yet to emerge from its cycle 
of political violence. The government’s heavy-handed, repressive response to chal-
lenges from the political opposition and to national security from extremists pro-
vokes violent counter-responses, aggravating pressure on a politicised police and judi-
ciary. The resentment it fuels makes accommodation with the opposition and, by 
extension, internal stability, more elusive. By using force and denying justice, it also 
provides extremist organisations an opportunity to exploit the resultant alienation 
and justify their anti-state agenda.  
This report examines the factors driving political instability and contributing to 
insecurity, and assesses the criminal justice system’s capacity to contain the threat of 
rising extremism and criminality and help to stem democratic collapse. Interviews 
were conducted with law enforcement and other government officials, political lead-
ers and civil society representatives, including the legal community and rights activ-
ists. Given the restrictions on political expression and dissent and the sensitivity of 
the information, most names and locations of some interviews have been withheld.  
 
 
1 For analysis of politics and security dynamics, see Crisis Group Asia Reports N°s 264, Mapping 
Bangladesh’s Political Crisis, 9 February 2015; 187, The Threat from Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bang-
ladesh, 1 March 2010; 182, Bangladesh: Getting Police Reform on Track, 11 December 2009; 151, 
Restoring Democracy in Bangladesh, 28 April 2008; and 121, Bangladesh Today, 23 October 2006. 
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II. Constitutional Distortions, Political Instability  
and Violence 
Bangladesh’s founders based the 1972 constitution on secularism, tolerance and eth-
nic identity, reflecting its creation out of a bloody civil war that followed decades of 
political struggle against Pakistani military regimes for autonomy, democratic gov-
ernance and the rights of the Bengali majority.2 Yet, subsequent amendments reflect-
ed a drift toward a more repressive polity. The second amendment (1973) gave the 
executive power to declare a state of emergency; the 1974 Special Powers Act author-
ised warrantless detention and imposed the death penalty for a wide range of offences, 
even adulteration of food.3 The fourth amendment (1975) in effect turned the coun-
try into a single-party state under the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League 
(BKSAL), banned media other than four state-owned newspapers and brought the 
lower judiciary directly under the executive. The 1975 military coup led to the assas-
sination of President Mujibur Rahman and much of his family, for which his daugh-
ter, current Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajid, blames military ruler Ziaur Rehman, 
former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia’s husband, thus sowing the seeds of the AL-BNP 
hostility that persists today.  
The fifth constitutional amendment, which validated the 1975 coup and subse-
quent martial law, provided indemnity to Mujib’s assassins. It also repealed the secu-
larism clause from the preamble, replacing it with “absolute trust and faith in almighty 
Allah”. This had significant ramifications for the law, state and minority rights, since 
most in Bangladesh are Buddhist, Hindu, Christian or animist.4 Rehman’s regime 
was also marked by extrajudicial killings, including of dozens of dissenting military 
officers, and trials of hundreds of soldiers by military courts.  
After General Hussain Muhammad Ershad ousted Zia’s regime in a palace coup 
in 1982, Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia jointly opposed the military regime, which, 
lasting until 1990, saw pro-democracy activists brutally killed by police, including 
the November 1987 slaying of a pro-AL protester that inspired a surge of demonstra-
tions.5 After the AL- and BNP-led pro-democracy movement brought Ershad down 
in 1990, civilian rule was restored. The BNP formed the government following the 
1991 elections, and the two parties continued to collaborate, including on the August 
1991 constitutional amendment to revive parliamentary democracy. After the AL 
boycotted the disputed February 1996 election, however, and held demonstrations 
that paralysed Dhaka, the BNP supported the thirteenth constitutional amendment, 
which provided for a 90-day caretaker government to oversee subsequent elections.6  
 
 
2 Bengali speakers in the east wing, now Bangladesh, were a majority of united Pakistan’s popula-
tion. Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (California, 1985), pp. 242-243. 
3 The law was enacted against the backdrop of a nine-month famine and mass starvation in 1974, 
when local businessmen were widely accused of hoarding and adulterating food supplies. 
4 The constitution did not recognise these groups as indigenous; as recently as October 2015, the 
government issued circulars warning against use of that word to describe ethno-religious minorities 
in any events hosted on public property. “Fresh restrictions on indigenous peoples stirs controversy”, 
Dhaka Tribune, 29 October 2015. 
5 “Shaheed Noor Hossain Day observed”, Prothom Alo, 10 November 2015.  
6 The system foresaw the president appointing the chief adviser and ten advisers within fifteen days 
of parliament’s dissolution to oversee elections within 90 days. The chief adviser would be the last 
serving Supreme Court chief justice, a retired appellate division justice or “an appropriate citizen”; 
if none were available, the president would take the role. The president would also assume defence 
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The caretaker system, however, contributed to deeper politicisation of state insti-
tutions, as governments filled them with loyalists to consolidate their rule, and also 
to retain influence during the caretaker administrations that oversaw elections. Hun-
dreds of bureaucrats were sanctioned for suspected sympathies and/or allegiance to 
the rival camp.7 In the second half of the BNP-led government (2001-2006), attacks 
on and killings of top opposition leaders also increased, with the AL accusing it of 
negligence or complicity.8 Countrywide violence before the scheduled 2006 polls gave 
the military justification to intervene on 11 January 2007, resulting in a military-
backed caretaker government that continued until December 2008. 
Democracy was restored in 2009, and the AL government’s June 2011 decision to 
amend the constitution to abolish the caretaker system, following a Supreme Court 
ruling declaring it unconstitutional, ended a process that, at least conceptually, pro-
vided for peaceful transfers of power. The 5 January 2014 polls were the most violent 
ever, and the BNP and its Jamaat ally marked their one-year anniversary with vio-
lent strikes and traffic blockades, triggering a brutal state response that led to four 
months in which more than 122 were killed and thousands of protestors detained.9  
Since mid-2015, there has been a veneer of calm. The BNP contested mayoral 
elections in 234 municipalities in December, and, while alleging massive rigging, 
refrained from violent confrontation. It also avoided violence when marking the 
second anniversary of the disputed elections in January 2016. However, the AL gov-
ernment continues to deny the opposition legitimate avenues for participation and 
dissent. In 2015, it suspended some 500 BNP-backed local government represent-
atives and replaced them with pro-AL officials.10 Thousands of criminal cases have 
been lodged against opposition members and activists. At least eight top BNP lead-
ers were arrested in 2015. Zia and her son, BNP Vice Chair Tarique Rahman, face 
corruption and other criminal charges that could imprison them for life. Given the 
fragility of the political system a single spark, such as Zia’s conviction, could reignite 
the violence that has brought the country to a virtual standstill twice since 2013.  
 
 
ministry powers and functions and have authority to promulgate ordinances and rules and, if needed, 
a state of emergency. Crisis Group Report, Mapping Bangladesh’s Political Crisis, op. cit. 
7 “Why OSD without specific reason: HC”, BDnews24.com, 4 June 2012.  
8 “Tarique was involved in Aug 21 grenade attack”, The Daily Star, 16 December 2015.  
9 Crisis Group Report, Mapping Bangladesh’s Political Crisis, op. cit. 
10 “Looking back 2015: Violence, no space for opposition mark politics”, The New Age, 31 December 
2015.  
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III. Law and Order Challenges 
A. Party-backed Violence and Criminality 
Bangladesh’s political culture has been described by a legal scholar as “relentlessly vio-
lent”, with governments exploiting the state machinery to suppress the opposition and 
the opposition mobilising violent party workers to undermine the government.11 This 
zero-sum game is responsible for the political impasse. In 14,000 incidents between 
2002 and the end of 2013, including 369 days of hartals (strikes), more than 2,400 
died and 126,300 were injured. Violence during strikes accounted for a quarter of the 
documented violence. The AL and BNP individually accounted for more than 40 per 
cent of the incidents against each other.12  
Party-linked student and youth groups that played a key role in opposing authori-
tarianism before Bangladesh’s birth and during military rule have mostly served as 
coercive wings for their parties since the 1990s. They are used to expand influence 
and entrench control, often by force, over resources and turf, including on college 
campuses. They are also used to enforce hartals and other forms of street agitation. 
With student politics “becoming synonymous with thuggery in the last twenty years”, 
the BNP’s student wing, Jatiyatabadi Chhatra Dal, and youth wing, Juba Dal, and 
the AL’s student wing, the Bangladesh Awami Chhatra League, and youth wing, Juba 
League are also increasingly involved in violent criminal activities.13  
Moreover, student and youth organisations also provide ruling parties a recruit-
ment pool for state institutions, including law enforcement agencies, which common-
ly ignore their violence and criminality. If linked to government, such groups in effect 
operate above the law. Even without such links, they exercise significant influence, 
enhancing their party’s recruitment potential. The temptation of financial reward 
through extortion and other means also attracts students from economically deprived 
backgrounds to these groups.14  
The Jamaat-e-Islami’s student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir, poses unique law en-
forcement challenges. In 1978, the Zia regime lifted the Mujib government’s ban on 
the party, which had opposed independence. Over the next two decades, the party 
established a robust grassroots and economic machinery that, even as it lacked broad 
popular support, translated into significant political clout. This enabled the Jamaat 
to join the BNP-led coalition government in 2001.  
Shibir’s violence is different in brutality, if not volume, from that of other parties’ 
youth wings.15 In February 2013, soon after the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) 
sentenced Jamaat Vice President Dilwar Hossain Sayadee to death (see below), its 
student activists committed unprecedented violence in a week that saw over 60 deaths, 
with police especially targeted.16 They were allegedly also responsible for some of the 
 
 
11 Saira Rahman Khan, “Vested Interest: The Human Rights Practices of Political Parties”, in Special 
Report: Inexistent Rule of Law in Bangladesh, Asian Human Rights Commission, vol. 13, nos. 2-3, 
June-September 2014. 
12 Bert Suykens and Aynul Islam, “Distribution of Political Violence in Bangladesh”, Conflict Re-
search Group, Department of Conflict and Development Studies, Ghent University, 2015.  
13 “Boys with guns”, The Star, 1 February 2013. 
14 Crisis Group interviews, editor, prominent daily; law enforcement officials, Dhaka, 22 December 
2015. 
15 Its methods reportedly include slicing the veins on the hands and feet of political opponents. “Shibir 
‘cuts’ BCL leader’s tendon”, Bdnews24.com, 31 October, 2013. 
16 “Shibir men attack cops in Rajshahi again”, The Daily Star, 1 April, 2013. 
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worst attacks during election-related violence in late 2013 and the early months of 
2015.17 Many Shibir leaders and activists have joined banned militant groups, such 
as Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), Jamaat-ul Mujaheedin Bangladesh 
(JMB) and Ansarullah Bangla Team.18 These include a prominent JMJB commander, 
Aziz ur Rahman (Bangla Bhai), executed in 2007, and Rezwanul Azad Rana, an abscond-
ing Ansarullah Bangla Team member sentenced to death for the murder of blogger 
Rajib in 2013 and the prime suspect in a number of 2015 blogger killings.19  
B. Extremist Violence 
1. State inaction and action 
Soon after Bangladesh’s formation, and during the 1980s and 1990s, radical leftist 
parties, such as Purba Banglar Communist Party, Biplobi Communist Party, Purba 
Banglar Sarbahara Party, Red Flag, Gono Mukti Fouz and Janajuddho conducted 
numerous attacks across the country. To counter them, paramilitary forces were 
raised, such as the Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini (National Defence Force, absorbed into the 
military in 1975).20 By the 2000s, the radical left threat was limited to low-scale 
criminal activity, mostly in the south west and parts of the north. The growth of reli-
gious extremist militancy was partly sparked by Islamist opposition to the left and, 
even more so to the AL and its secular political leanings.  
In 2004, a new organisation, the JMJB, carried out vigilante “justice” against radi-
cal leftist activists in the northern Bagmara district.21 Within a year of its formation, 
calling for imposition of Sharia (Islamic law), a number of other Islamist extremist 
organisations, including JMB and Harkatul Jihad Al Islami-Bangladesh (HUJI-B) 
conducted major attacks across the country, including suicide bombings of courts in 
Chittagong and Gazipur and attacks on judges in Jhalakathi. Among the most prom-
inent was the 21 August 2004 grenade attack on the AL rally that injured Sheikh 
Hasina and killed a senior party member and twenty others. This was followed by 
countrywide synchronised bombings in 63 of 64 districts on 17 August 2005. Some 
groups, including JMB and HUJI-B, had close links with regional extremists, such as 
the Pakistan-based, anti-India Lashkar-e-Tayyaba.22 
Though religious extremism arose under its watch, the BNP-led coalition govern-
ment (2001-2006), which included the Jamaat, did not target radical Islamist groups. 
Some security analysts believe that the BNP, and certainly its Jamaat ally, shared their 
political ideology and goals.23 Driven similarly by animosity towards India, Bangla-
desh’s military and some political actors, including within the BNP, also patronised 
 
 
17 Crisis Group Report, Mapping Bangladesh’s Political Crisis, op. cit. 
18 Crisis Group interviews, law enforcement officials and security experts, Dhaka, November 2015- 
January 2016. 
19 “Bangla Bhai active for six years”, The Daily Star, 13 May 2004. “Blogger Rajib Killing: Convicted 
Rana hiding in Malaysia”, The New Age, 22 January 2016.  
20 “Myth, reality and Rakkhi Bahini”, The Daily Star, 13 January 2014. The Rapid Action Battalion 
(RAB), Rakkhi Bahini’s successor, has conducted similar operations against radical leftists. “Purbo 
Banglar Communist Party founder Mofakkhar killed in Rab action”, The Asian Tribune, 19 Decem-
ber 2004.  
21 Eliza Griswold, “The Next Islamist Revolution?”, The New York Times Magazine, 23 January 
2005.  
22 Crisis Group Report, The Threat from Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh, op. cit. 
23 Crisis Group interviews, Dhaka, November 2015; Brian Vaughn, Bangladesh: Political and Secu-
rity Developments and US Interests (Pennsylvania, 2001).  
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and protected various Islamist extremist groups to support insurgencies in India’s 
north-eastern provinces and Myanmar’s Rakhine state.24 However, under intense 
international and domestic pressure after the August 2005 synchronised attacks, the 
BNP government responded aggressively, hanging six top JMB leaders and impris-
oning several by 2007.25 The military-backed caretaker government (2007-2008) 
continued this punitive approach. 
After assuming office in 2009, the AL empowered the police and the elite Rapid 
Action Battalion (RAB) to apprehend extremists, dismantle militant cells and coun-
ter their ability to radicalise and recruit. As part of a nationwide anti-radicalisation 
scheme, imams at mosques were trained to give anti-militancy sermons during Fri-
day prayers. Parliament passed the Anti-Terrorism Act in 2009, since amended twice, 
and the Anti-Money Laundering Act in 2012 to prevent terrorism financing. Accord-
ing to police statistics, more than 2,400 militants were arrested between 2005 and 
2013; at least 154 Islamist extremists are currently on death row.26 
2. Re-emergent extremism 
Though the crackdown undermined their ability to freely recruit, plan and conduct 
operations, Islamist extremists are now exploiting acute political polarisation, as 
they did during the BNP-led coalition government, to regroup. Moreover, the deeply-
flawed ICT process is being used to depict the AL as anti-Islam and a threat to Ban-
gladesh’s Muslim identity. Protests by secular nationalist elements challenging some 
ICT verdicts have also galvanised extremist groups.   
The ICT’s February 2013 death sentence on Jamaat Vice President Sayadee, as 
noted, led to deadly clashes with police. In September 2013, the Supreme Court 
commuted the sentence to life imprisonment, sparking major protests by those who 
wanted it upheld.27 In February 2013, the ICT had also sentenced Jamaat leader Ab-
dul Quader Mollah to life imprisonment, provoking mass protests in Dhaka’s Shah-
bagh square demanding a death sentence. In response, the government amended a 
law prohibiting the state from challenging ICT verdicts. On appeal, the court raised 
the sentence to death in September 2013. 
The Shahbagh movement mobilised a counter-response from the Hefazat-e-Islam 
(Protection of Islam), an Islamist coalition, fed by a mushrooming qaumi (privately-
run) madrasa sector that, unlike government-run madrasas, escapes regulation.28 
Portraying the Shahbagh protestors as atheists, it held major demonstrations in 
Chittagong and elsewhere, including a 3 May 2013 congregation in the capital that 
the police dispersed aggressively. Mollah’s hanging that December added grist to 
Hefazat’s propaganda mill. The ICT, Shahbagh movement and executions of popular 
 
 
24 In the late 1970s, Dhaka accused Indian intelligence agencies of supporting the insurgency in the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts, bordering on Myanmar. Similarly, the Indian security establishment for 
years, especially during BNP-led regimes, accused Bangladesh’s top intelligence agency, the Direc-
torate General of Force Intelligence, of sponsoring terrorism in India. Crisis Group interview, retired 
military and RAB officials, Dhaka, December 2015. Special Report, op. cit. 
25 “Bangla Bhai active for 6 yrs: His outfit spreads tentacles to establish Taliban-like rule”, The Daily 
Star, 13 May 2004; “Bangladesh executes 6 Islamist militants”, The New York Times, 30 March 2007.  
26 Data provided to Crisis Group by the home ministry, Dhaka, October 2014. Also, “Radicalism 
growing freely”, The Daily Star, 12 November 2015.  
27 “Bangladesh Islamist’s war crimes life sentence”, Reuters, 17 September 2013. 
28 According to the home ministry, the Hefazat-e-Islam was formed in 1948, when Bangladesh was 
still part of Pakistan.  
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clerics gave the group a new campaign with broader appeal than its original agenda 
focused on curtailing women’s freedom, including a work ban. Its increased appeal 
was also evidence of rising Islamist influence in rural areas. In negotiations to end 
Hefazat protests, the AL government agreed, among other concessions, to abandon 
intended reforms to regulate the qaumi madrasa sector.29 
Bangladesh has over 14,000 qaumi madrasas, with some 1.4 million students, 
mostly from rural and economically-deprived areas. The sector has resisted moderni-
sation and regulation efforts by governments and remains independent of the nation-
al educational curriculum, amplifying concerns it serves as an extremist recruitment 
pool. The AL government has reportedly increased surveillance over such madrasas 
and some authors and publishers of inflammatory texts taught in them. 30  
In 2013, a new Islamist organisation, Ansarullah Bangla Team, espousing al-
Qaeda’s ideology, marked its appearance with the brutal killing of blogger and 
Shahbagh organiser Ahmed Rajib Haider Shovon and attacks on two other bloggers. 
It reportedly has a hit list of 84 “atheist” bloggers, of which nine have been killed, as 
well as two publishers. The Bangladeshi-American blogger Avijit Roy was the first of 
five victims of brutal murders and attacks in 2015; on 6 April 2016, another secular 
blogger, Nazimuddin Samad was murdered in Dhaka.31 These attacks symbolise a 
new kind of extremist threat, aimed at silencing liberal and secular voices. Attacks 
on foreigners have also increased, including the 28 August 2015 killing of an Italian 
national in Dhaka, the 3 September murder of a Japanese national in Rangpur and 
the 20 November attack on an Italian priest. While the killing of the publishers was 
claimed by al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), the other attacks were 
claimed by the Islamic State (IS), raising concerns that rivalry between the new en-
trants to the Bangladeshi jihadist landscape could potentially escalate.32  
Though the police have arrested extremist suspects for the attacks on foreigners, 
senior officials, including Prime Minister Hasina, attribute these to hired hands of 
the BNP and Jamaat.33 The government has also criticised the blogger community for 
promoting atheism and was silent when the Ulema League, an AL-affiliated religious 
group, demanded the death penalty for anyone insulting religious sentiments.34 Such 
 
 
29 Crisis Group Report, Mapping Bangladesh’s Political Crisis, op. cit.; “Hefazat chief helped draft 
policy, then opposed it”, The Daily Star, 19 March 2014. 
30 “Qaumi madrasas under scanner”, Dhaka Tribune, 26 April 2014. 
31 “Secular activist who criticised Islamism killed in Dhaka”, The Guardian, 7 April 2016; “Blogger 
Rajib killing: Convicted Rana hiding in Malaysia”, The New Age, 20 January 2016. “Bangladeshi 
blogger named on hit list warned: ‘You will be next’”, The Guardian, 28 May 2015. “Bangladesh: 
Killing of blogger blow to free speech”, Human Rights Watch, 12 May 2015; “In Bangladesh, blogging 
can get you killed”, Amnesty International, 9 November 2015. 
32 AQIS was set up by Aimal al-Zawahari in September 2014 in response to Islamic State (IS) leader 
Abu Bakar al-Bagdadi’s challenge. “Al Qaeda claims responsibility for attacks on two publishers in 
Bangladesh”, The New York Times, 1 November 2015; “For foreigners, fears grow over killings 
claimed by Islamic State in Bangladesh”, The Washington Post, 20 November 2015; “Another Italian 
national shot at”, The New Age, 19 November 2015; “Italian aid worker killing: no clue to murder”, 
The New Age, 30 September 2015; “Yet another foreigner shot to death”, The New Age, 4 October 
2015. 
33 “All evidence shows us it’s not ISIS”, said Sajeeb Wazed, the prime minister’s son and chief gov-
ernment adviser on information technology, adding that the four suspects in the Italian aid worker’s 
killing “have no affiliation to know terrorist organisations. They’re just criminals”. “For foreigners, 
fears grow over killings”, op. cit. 
34 “Militants change tactics, but govt in Bangladesh sticks to old strategy”, The Daily Star, 7 August 
2015. 
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statements provoke misgivings even among sympathisers about the AL’s commitment 
to its secularist credentials. 
Sectarian attacks and attacks on religious minorities (see below) also intensified 
toward the end of 2015, including on a Shia procession to mark Ashura on 24 Octo-
ber; on Shia and Ahmadi mosques and shrines, two Hindu temples and several minor-
ity religious and community leaders. Two mosques on the largest naval base were also 
bombed.35 None of these produced large casualties, but they reflect a rising extremist 
threat. Law enforcement agencies have arrested several suspects, including three 
each for the Ashura and Shia mosque attacks and eighteen alleged JMB militants for 
six attacks in the north. Yet, statements by officials blame the opposition, or an “inter-
national conspiracy” for the actions, sending mixed messages about government inten-
tions. Moreover, with guilt largely based on confessions in custody, there are doubts 
about the credibility of the law enforcement response.36  
Those responsible for the recent attacks, according to informed observers, may 
represent a new generation of extremists, particularly from the JMB and Ansarullah 
Bangla Team, who are more sophisticated and more linked to transnational jihadist 
networks.37 Detective-branch officials are concerned about the sophisticated explo-
sives used by and information technology skills of arrested suspects. “From 2003 to 
2005, militant suspects were either illiterate or poor madrasa-educated students. We 
are worried, as this time most of the suspects are educated and technologically 
sound”, said a senior police official.38 Without an effective government response, the 
extremist menace is likely to grow, threatening religious minorities in particular and 
undermining the country’s secular credentials.  
3. Attacks on minorities 
Largely ethnically Bengali and Muslim, Bangladesh also has a 10 per cent religious, 
ethnic and linguistic minority.39 Hindus, the largest religious minority, roughly 9 per 
cent of the population, are often significant in national elections.40 Historically, their 
support of the secular, centre-left AL has brought them important benefits, such as 
police appointments, but has also invited anti-Hindu attacks, particularly by Jamaat 
activists during elections.41 During the 2001 polls, 330 attacks were reported against 
Hindus in 57 districts, including assault, rape and murder. After years of denial by 
the BNP-led government about those incidents, the AL government formed a three-
member judicial commission in 2010 to investigate them. Its 2011 report accused 
more than 25,000 BNP and Jamaat activists, and at least 25 then ministers, of in-
volvement.42 However, the government did not implement the recommendations to 
 
 
35 “Police arrest ex-PDB chairman Khijir Khan’s murder ‘mastermind’, another suspect”, BDnews 
24.com, 10 October 2015; “10 injured in bomb attack on Hindu religious gathering in Bangladesh”, 
India Today, 5 December 2015; “One killed and scores wounded in attack at Shia site in Bangladesh 
capital”, The Guardian, 24 October 2015; “Baha’i leader injured in shooting”, NTVBD.com, 8 No-
vember 2015; “Many injured in twin blasts in navy mosques”, The New Age, 19 December 2015.  
36 Crisis Group interviews, human rights activists, lawyers, Dhaka, February 2016. 
37 Crisis Group interviews, security experts, Dhaka, February 2016. 
38 Crisis group interview, Dhaka, 3 February 2016. 
39 Population Census, Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2011. 
40 Crisis Group interview, prominent academic, Dhaka University, Dhaka, January 2016.  
41 Crisis Group interview, human rights activist, 26 October 2015.  
42 Anbarasan Ethirajan, “Bangladesh ‘persecution’ panel reports on 2001 violence”, BBC report, 
2 December 2011.  
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establish investigation committees in every district. Similar attacks against Hindus 
occurred around the January 2014 elections.43  
A leading human rights group described attacks on Hindus as “persistent back-
ground noise”, referring to their continuation at a lower intensity even during peri-
ods of general calm.44 However, Hindus’ safety is particularly hostage to broader po-
litical developments, their communities bearing the brunt of Islamist mobilisation. 
After the 2013 ICT verdict against Sayadee, for example, Islamist activists destroyed 
280 Hindu homes, 200 Hindu-run businesses and 500 Hindu temples, injuring 
around 190 people. Attacks on temples and desecration and theft of Hindu idols now 
occur regularly. Seizure of Hindu-owned homes by local elites, reportedly including 
AL and BNP politicians, is also common.45 The systematic targeting of women, espe-
cially rape, regardless of the perpetrators’ political leanings, is common to attacks on 
minority communities.46 While many are arrested, largely due to media coverage, 
most are released, such as the alleged mastermind of the 2012 attacks on the Buddhist 
community in Cox’s Bazar.47  
Non-Bengali Muslims, commonly known as Biharis, who settled in Pakistan’s east 
wing from Bihar after independence in 1947 and are seen as Pakistani sympathisers, 
confront similar threats. In 2014, nine were burnt alive and one killed by police 
shots in an alleged Dhaka land-grabbing case. The first response of law enforcement 
was to pick up seven local Biharis, which further infuriated that community. Calls to 
bring allegedly involved local AL leaders to justice remain unheeded.48 
 
 
43 Mushfique Wadud, “Minorities targeted in Bangladesh political violence”, IRIN, 31 January 2014.  
44 “Rights of Religious Minorities”, Ain o Salish Kendra (human rights organisation), 2008. 
45 “Violence against Hindus: 2013 overview”, Ain o Shalish Kendra, 8 January 2014. “An inquiry 
into causes and consequences of deprivation of Hindu minorities in Bangladesh through the Vested 
Property Act: framework for a realistic solution”, in Religion – A Tool for Discrimination in South 
Asia, South Asians for Human Rights (SAHR), 2010. Supporters of ex-AL State Minister for Home 
Affairs Shamsul Hoque Tuku were allegedly responsible for arson on Hindu homes in 2013. In Jan-
uary 2016, an AL lawmaker was reportedly implicated in land grabbing from Hindus in a district 
bordering India. “Tuku’s kin quizzed over attack on Hindus”, BDnews24.com, 13 November 2013; 
“Judicial probe sought into land grabbing by Thakurgaon MP”, The New Age, 9 January 2016.  
46 In 2014, police charged ten people with gang rape of two Hindu women in Jessore during elec-
tion-related violence, but a local AL youth wing leader, first to be arrested, was not charged. “Charges 
pressed against 10 for Monirampur gang rape”, The New Age, 9 August 2014.  
47 “Ramu attacks: Prime suspect enjoying chairmanship”, Dhaka Tribune, 29 September 2014. 
48 “10 dead in arson attack on Mirpur Bihari camp”, The New Age, 15 June 2014. 
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IV. Political Polarisation, Law Enforcement  
and Human Rights  
Both BNP and AL governments have pursued counter-terrorism measures such as 
BNP’s creation of RAB and AL’s Anti-Terrorism Act. While apparently effective in 
suppressing extremist groups in the short term, they have, by undermining human 
rights and rule of law, fuelled alienation and heightened political tensions, providing 
violent extremists new opportunities to regroup, recruit and re-emerge.  
Political polarisation has played a major part in contributing to the abuses. In 
October 2002, for instance, the BNP-led coalition launched “Operation Clean Heart” 
to counter rising crime. Led by the military in “aid of civilian authority”, it was justi-
fied by Prime Minister Khaleda Zia on the grounds that the police lacked capacity. 
However, the AL and other opposition groups accused the government of targeting 
political opponents rather than criminals.49 In an implicit acknowledgement of 
abuses, the government promulgated an ordinance indemnifying military personnel 
against prosecution for casualties, injury, and damage to property caused by the oper-
ation.50 According to Human Rights Watch, at least 60 people were killed extrajudi-
cially.51 RAB’s creation in 20o4 institutionalised the military’s law enforcement role. 
Allegations of RAB excesses, including abduction, torture and extrajudicial killing, 
have been made ever since.52  
In its 2009 electoral manifesto, the AL pledged that its government would prevent 
human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, and such abuses did decline in 
the first two years of its second government. However, as tensions with the BNP 
escalated, extrajudicial killings became more frequent, as did other human rights 
abuses, such as illegal detentions and enforced disappearances, mainly of opposition 
activists. As the record of the current AL government shows, these appear to have 
increased with each successive dispensation. By September 2014, some 24,000 
opposition BNP leaders and activists had been charged in some 500 cases, including 
acting Secretary General Fakhrul Islam Alamgir, two joint secretaries general and 
several standing committee members.53 
Killings, particularly by RAB, are often justified as having occurred during a 
shoot-out or crossfire – commonly referred to as “encounter killings”.54 According to 
human rights activists, other law enforcement agencies are copying RAB’s methods, 
with the police possibly overtaking it in extrajudicial killings.55 Anti-terrorism leg-
islation, enacted in 2009 and amended twice thereafter, is frequently misused to 
suppress dissent, including through provisions that allow social media posts to be 
 
 
49 Sumit Ganguly, “Bangladesh and India” in Larry Diamond, Leonardo Morlini (eds.), Assessing 
the Quality of Democracy (Washington DC, 2005), p. 177. 
50 Joint Drive Indemnity Ordinance 2003. 
51 “Bangladesh crime fight”, BBC news online, 1 November 2002; “HC scraps law giving indemnity to 
‘Operation Clean Heart’”, BDnews24.com, 13 September 2015; “Operation clean heart: HC declares 
actions of operation illegal”, The New Age, 14 September 2015; “Bangladesh: Events of 2005”, Human 
Rights Watch, 2006.  
52 Crisis Group Report, Mapping Bangladesh’s Political Crisis, op. cit. 
53 “BNP ‘legally’ trapped”, The Daily Star, 2 September 2014.  
54 Ridwanul Haque, Judicial Activism in Bangladesh: A Golden Means Approach (Newcastle, 
2001), pp. 230-231. 
55 “Extrajudicial killings continue”, Odhikar monthly report (November 2015), 1 December 2015. 
Odhikar, a leading rights organisation, conducts regular fact-finding missions and maintains the 
most extensive data available in Bangladesh on rights abuse by the law enforcement agencies. 
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used as evidence.56 Opposition leaders and activists are a significant proportion of 
the victims of alleged extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, illegal deten-
tions and torture in remand by police and RAB.57 Several prominent opposition 
leaders, including parliamentarians and former ministers, have disappeared after 
allegedly being apprehended by law enforcers.58  
In 2007, Inspector General Police (IGP) Nurul Huda reportedly sent the govern-
ment a proposal to establish a police commission, headed by the home minister and 
comprising civil society members, including human rights defenders, to make the 
institution more accountable to the public. It has yet to be adopted. 59 
RAB and the police detective branch often convene press briefings at their head-
quarters to link detainees to numerous terrorist offences but without details of the 
investigation or evidence.60 “These briefings have an aura of the surreal”, said a se-
curity expert.61 “The practice of producing alleged criminals in front of the media is 
absolutely illegal, as the CrPC [Code of Criminal Procedure] clearly states that a 
detainee must first be produced in court”, said a senior criminal lawyer of the Dhaka 
magistrate court.62 Conducted by top law enforcement officials, the briefings make it 
near impossible for investigators to report any findings that contradict what their 
superiors had publicly announced.63 Overreliance on confessions encourages brutal 
means to extract them; law enforcers are widely accused of obtaining false confes-
sions of terrorist acts from petty criminals. Family members often allege that sus-
pects were taken from their homes weeks or months before their “formal” arrests; 
many detainees later say in court that they were tortured to extract confessions.64  
The government purportedly investigates allegations of extrajudicial killings 
through executive magistrates, but findings are not made public. The Torture and 
Custodial Death (Prevention) Act of 2013 establishes life sentences for law enforce-
ment officials convicted of custodial deaths and bars justification on the grounds of 
“exceptional circumstances”. Yet, these abuses continue, with a prominent AL par-
liamentarian and bill author attributing them to law enforcers’ lack of familiarity or 
 
 
56 “Bangladesh: New amendment to Anti-Terrorism Act gags Freedom of Expression”, joint state-
ment, International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and Odhikar, http://odhikar.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/06/Statement-FIDH-Odhikar-ATA-2013-eng.pdf . 
57 “Democracy in the cross-fire: Opposition violence and government abuses in the 2014 pre and 
post-election period in Bangladesh”, Human Rights Watch, April 2014.  
58 David Bergman and Muktadir Rashid, “Anatomy of a Disappearance, and a Reappearance”, The 
Wire, 23 May 2015; “Ilias Ali, driver go missing”, The Daily Star, 19 April 2012.  
59 Crisis Group interview, Muhammad Nurul Huda, February 2016. As IGP, Huda had recom-
mended the Police Act be amended to introduce a police commission to ensure accountability of and 
provide “broader” policy directions to the police. Such a commission could then pave the way for a 
more permanent accountability body. Muhammad Nurul Huda, “Reform imperatives for the police”, 
The Daily Star, thirteenth anniversary special, 2004. 
60 “RAB arrests 12 alleged AQIS militants from capital”, The Independent (Dhaka), 3 July 2015. 
Also see website, Dhaka Metropolitan Police, at www.dmp.gov.bd. 
61 Crisis Group interview, Dhaka, November 2015.  
62 Crisis Group interview, Dhaka, February 2016. 
63 Crisis Group interview, Dhaka, February 2016. 
64 “Joj gives a deposition”, Prothom Alo, 30 September 2013. “Human rights monitoring report: 1 – 31 
January 2016”, Odhikar, 1 February 2016; “Tavella murder: three suspects on remand”, The New Age, 
27 October 2015. 
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sensitisation to the law and lack of awareness of the victims and their families about 
legal recourse it provides.65  
According to lawyers, the absence of a penal code provision criminalising disap-
pearances has complicated efforts to bring law enforcement personnel to account, at 
least in trial courts.66 A prominent human rights organisation, Odhikar, reported 64 
disappearances in 2015, up from 53 in 2013.67 The higher judiciary must put an end 
to such practices and ensure perpetrators are held accountable. Most importantly, 
the government must realise that extrajudicial disappearances and other human 
rights abuses undermine public confidence in its ability to deliver justice.  
 
 
65 Crisis Group interview, Saber Hossain Chowdhury, Dhaka, February 2016; “Another killing case 
filed against SI Zahid”, The New Age, 8 August 2014. 
66 Mohammed Ashrafuzzaman, “Rule of Law in Bangladesh: Normative standards and reality’s mir-
ror”, in Special Report, op. cit.  
67 “Human rights monitoring report: 1-31 January 2016”, Odhikar, 1 February 2016; “Human rights 
report: 2014”, Odikhar, no date. 
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V. The Dysfunctional Criminal Justice System 
A. Flawed Legal Regime 
The criminal justice regime is based on the colonial-era framework of the 1860 Penal 
Code, the 1872 Evidence Act and the 1898 Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). That 
these continue to serve their original punitive and suppressive purposes, rather than 
prevention, reform and rehabilitation, is reflected in a high prison population – 
75,000-80,000 in 68 jails with a capacity of only about 30,000. Inadequate bail 
provisions, due to political pressure, as well as inadequate resources and legal 
frameworks, compound the problem.68 From 2008 to 2011, only 683 of more than 
18,000 convicted prisoners were put on probation.69  
Periods of political turmoil, such as now, have further strained the prison system, 
with the number of inmates often doubling, in some cases forcing authorities to set 
up tents or lay out mats on porches to accommodate them.70 Given the case backlog 
and mass arrests of opposition activists, only one-third of prisoners are convicted, 
let alone tried; often untried prisoners remain behind bars beyond the maximum 
sentence for the crimes with which they have been charged.71  
The penal system relies heavily on the death penalty. Some 250 were hanged 
from 1971 to 2008, and 23 between January 2009 and March 2016. Around 1,200 
prisoners remain on death row, awaiting the result their appeals to the Supreme 
Court.72 Presidential reprieves for death row prisoners are commonly given to ruling 
party members or loyalists sentenced during an earlier regime.73 
While the CrPC and Evidence Act were amended in the 1980s, they are still sig-
nificantly short of the needs of a modern, accountable justice system. The Evidence 
Act allows a person under trial for rape to question the moral character of the vic-
tim; there is no witness protection program; and monetary ceilings for some serious 
offences were set more than a century ago.74  
Section 54 of the CrPC allows the police to arrest a person without warrant or 
court order on grounds of “reasonable suspicion”, “reasonable complaint”, or “credi-
ble information” about the person being “concerned in any cognizable offense”, and 
“any person having in his possession without lawful excuse any implement of house-
breaking”, among nine equally vague provisions. Under Section 167, magistrates can 
authorise fifteen-day extensions of custody if the police fail to complete initial inves-
tigation within the stipulated twenty-four hours.75 The High Court bench of the 
Supreme Court acknowledged in a 2003 case addressing the rise in custodial deaths 
that the vagueness of these provisions has been widely manipulated to harass and 
 
 
68 Crisis Group interview, former deputy inspector general of prisons, Dhaka, January 2016.  
69 “Development and Use of the Probation System in Bangladesh”, Bangladesh Legal Aid and Ser-
vices Trust (BLAST) and Penal Reform International (PRI), 13 March 2014.  
70 Crisis Group interview, Adilur Rahman Khan, secretary, Odhikar, Dhaka, October 2015.  
71 Crisis Group interview, former deputy inspector general of prisons, Dhaka, January 2016.  
72 “Bangladesh criminal justice through the prism of capital punishment and the fight against ter-
rorism”, International Freedom for Human Rights report, October 2010; Bangladesh country data, 
Cornell Law School database, at www.deathpenaltyworldwide.org/country-search-post.cfm?country 
=bangladesh; “Nearly 1,200 SC prisoners await SC verdict”, The New Age, 19 December 2015.  
73 “President pardons a criminal twice’”, The Daily Star, 27 February 2012. 
74 “Observations of the Bangladesh Law Commission on the draft of the Bangladesh Criminal Pro-
cedure Amendment Bill 2013”, 1 July 2013. 
75 Sections 54 and 167, Bangladesh Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. 
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detain political activists. It also established fifteen guidelines for arrest and police 
remand.76 Since the ruling, Section 54’s use has decreased, other laws are reportedly 
used, including local police acts specific to some administrative divisions, to detain 
persons without charge.77  
Changes made in the legal regime further undermine accountability. Lacking a 
clear definition of terrorism, the Anti-Terrorism Act allows for trial of offences as 
vague as threatening the “solidarity of Bangladesh”.78 The 2009 Mobile Court Act 
restored judicial authority to executive magistrates and empowered them to award 
jail sentences of up to two years without allowing a legal defence. The 2001 Tele-
communications Act gave the executive wide powers of surveillance without judicial 
oversight. Section 57 of the 2013 Information and Communication Technology Act 
allows trials of anyone bringing disrepute or causing offence to public officials and 
other public figures.79 Absent legal definitions or judicial interpretation of “disrepute” 
or “offense”, this in effect covers all form of criticism and dissent.80  
B. Policing and Political Interference  
A legal scholar noted that the AL and BNP have both relied on the law enforcement 
apparatus to strengthen their “right to rule” instead of the “rule of law”.81 The police 
are widely perceived as politicised, corrupt and inept.82 Police recruitment and ap-
pointments are largely on partisan grounds, and parliamentarians regularly interfere 
in postings and transfers of officers in their constituencies.83 Most senior and mid-
level positions are filled by officers who demonstrate allegiance to ruling parties and 
take their cues from the government of the day. While appointments and transfers of 
low-ranking officers up to inspector are done internally, the home ministry controls 
these, and promotions, for assistant superintendents and above.  
Many top officials, such as the inspector general, the Dhaka police chief, national 
police spokesperson and heads of elite forces such as the RAB reportedly have direct 
 
 
76 Iftekhar Ahmed Ronnie, “Direction to amend section 54 and 167 of CrPC”, Ain O Salish Kendra, 
20 May 2003. For the Supreme Court’s divisions and their jurisdictions, see fn. 101 below. 
77 Crisis Group interview, lawyers, Dhaka, February, 2016. For instance, Chapter V, Police Regu-
lations, the Dhaka Metropolitan Police Ordinance, 1976 (Ordinance no. III, 1976), empowers the 
police commissioner “whenever and for such time as he considers necessary for the preservation of 
public peace or safety” to prohibit, among other activities, “the delivery of public harangues, the use of 
gestures or mimetic representations, and the preparation, exhibition or dissemination of pictures, 
symbols, placards or any other object or thing which may, in his opinion, offend against decency or 
morality or undermine the security of the State”.  
78 The amended Anti-Terrorism Act covers measures to combat terrorism financing; domestic pro-
scription and listing of persons or entities; investigation of offences, and judgement procedures. 
Text of “Anti-Terrorism Rules, 2013”, home affairs ministry at www.mha.gov.bd. Also, “Bangladesh 
criminal justice”, op. cit. 
79 The Mobile Court Act 2009 (Act no. 59 of 2009); The Bangladesh Telecommunication Act 2001 
(Act no. 18 of 2001). 
80 Crisis Group interview, assistant judge, district sessions court, December 2015. 
81 Saira Rahman Khan, op. cit.  
82 In national household surveys by Transparency International – Bangladesh, law enforcement 
agencies have consistently ranked among the top two most corrupt institutions; see “Corruption 
in Service Sectors: National Household Survey 2012”.  
83 Crisis Group interviews, Criminal Investigation Department (CID) officers, Dhaka, November 
2015. 
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links to the prime minister or her office.84 Senior officials also often influence inves-
tigations, driven by partisanship, nepotism or financial gain; public statements by 
the prime minister or ministers identifying or supporting suspected perpetrators 
hamper investigations, and charges are often politicised. For example, once the Awami 
League returned to power, the police chief at the time of the 21 August 2004 attack 
on the AL rally was accused of involvement in the crime, as was the first investigating 
officer.85 
The force, moreover, is grossly understaffed, with an estimated 161,000 officers 
serving a population of 160 million, roughly 1:1,000.86 Constables, with no investiga-
tive authority or training, and functions largely limited to patrols or guarding VIPs, 
are two-thirds of the force. The 40,000 officers with authority to investigate are 
overburdened: an officer typically investigates some fifteen cases a month.87 
Investigative capacity is also low. According to common practice in stations, the 
officer who records a complaint conducts the preliminary investigation and submits 
a charge sheet.88 Criminal cases largely depend on confessions to judicial magistrates 
under Section 164 of the CrPC. Allegations are widespread that police misuse a fifteen-
day CrPC remand provision to force confessions by torture and blackmail. Defend-
ants often retract confessions in court, claiming duress.89 Prosecutors argue that police 
failure to produce credible witnesses also undermines convictions.90 Yet, witnesses will 
not come forth without an adequately resourced protection program. More important-
ly, the CrPC and Evidence Act should be amended to make forensic and documentary, 
rather than ocular, evidence the foundation of investigation.91 
The government set up a Police Bureau of Investigation (PBI) in 2012, with some 
970 positions, including police and other civil servants and led by a deputy police 
inspector general, to impart and deploy specialised, scientific methodology. Opera-
tional in August 2015, it is currently investigating around 3,000 cases. Because it is 
yet to be properly resourced, however, it is unable to help build successful cases or to 
wrest the investigation lead from RAB and the detective branch.92 
While the PBI should get the necessary resources, staff and government backing, 
training in preliminary investigation skills should also be given to rank-and-file 
police to ease the burden on specialised investigators and make the force more effi-
cient. The CID, Dhaka Metropolitan Police and RAB have separate criminal intelli-
gence and analysis units. Establishing such a unit with a central database of forensic 
and other documentary evidence would enable more coordinated, proactive, special-
ised responses to security challenges from criminal activity to religious extremism.93  
 
 
84 Crisis Group interview, senior official, National Human Rights Commission, Dhaka, December 
2015. 
85 “Tarique, Babar indicted”, The Daily Star, 19 March 2012. 
86 Crisis Group interviews, CID officers, Dhaka, November 2015. Most countries with well-
developed police forces have a ratio of 1:400-500. 
87 The Bangladesh police recommend a maximum workload of eight cases. Crisis Group interview, 
senior police official, January 2016.  
88 “Observations of the Bangladesh Law Commission”, op.cit.  
89 Crisis Group interviews, lawyers, judges, Dhaka, February 2016; “Bangladesh: Events of 2005”, 
op. cit.  
90 “Bangladesh criminal justice through the prism of capital punishment”, op. cit.  
91 There are five forensic laboratories in Dhaka and Chittagong, but their use is fairly limited; 
a cyber forensic laboratory is currently being set up at the CID.  
92 “Police Bureau of Investigation starts functioning after 3 years”, The New Age, 25 August 2015.  
93 Crisis Group interview, CID officer, Dhaka, November 2015. 
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C. Prosecution Weaknesses 
Prosecution was under police remit until reforms in 2007, which, instead of estab-
lishing a separate, independent service, transferred it to the law ministry. Nine years 
later, prosecutors have yet to develop an institutional identity or gain public credibil-
ity. There are 68 public prosecutors, some 40 additional prosecutors and 500 assis-
tant prosecutors.94 The law ministry generally appoints them on political affiliation, 
not merit, the only professional requirement being two years with a local bar. Politi-
cally appointed prosecutors often serve as another government enforcement tool. A 
judge alleged that some prosecutors extort both victims and defendants and use their 
political clout to pressure fellow judges.95 
There is no separate salary or career structure or specialised training for prose-
cutors, who often lack the skills to frame and argue cases that hold up in court. 
Moreover, politically-appointed prosecutors are often replaced when governments 
change.96 Such changes regularly delay or extend cases, which can take several years 
to conclude.97 An August 2015 Law Commission report found that disposal of crimi-
nal cases had dropped by nearly 50 per cent since 2009, when assistant prosecutors 
took over the trying of cases from police sub-inspectors. Conviction rates have also 
dropped from close to 52 per cent to 43.5 per cent and are even lower for serious 
crimes. In December 2015, 30 suspected militants were reportedly released in five 
cases, and another 151 are set to be released because the investigating officer failed 
to follow basic procedure under the Anti-Terrorism Act.98 
The government shelved the 2008 General Attorney Services Ordinance amid 
criticism that it lacked an effective model for monitoring and holding prosecutors 
accountable. Yet, effective supervision and/or performance evaluation is still absent. 
Poorly paid, many continue to work as private lawyers, often ignoring their official 
duties.99 Though many fail to appear at hearings or produce witnesses, the law min-
istry refrains disciplining its appointees. If a judge lodges a complaint, the most done 
is to replace the assistant prosecutor for that case.100 
An autonomous prosecution service should be established, with a separate ade-
quate budget. While the law ministry should appoint the prosecutor general, internal 
appointments should be based on professional criteria, including a strong criminal 
defence record, and followed up by specialised training. A training academy for 
prosecutors, possibly with international support, should be created. To ensure inde-
pendence and quality, prosecutors should be given competitive salaries and secure 
tenure. To ensure accountability, a supervisory authority should be set up, comprised 
 
 
94 Information provided to Crisis Group by an assistant public prosecutor, Dhaka, December 2015. 
95 Crisis Group interview, assistant judge, district sessions court, December 2015.  
96 International Commission of Jurists submission to the Universal Periodic Review of Bangladesh, 
sixteenth session of working group, UN Human Rights Council, 22 April-3 May 2013; “Overview of 
corruption within the justice sector and law enforcement agencies in Bangladesh”, U4 Expert Answer 
website (U4.no), Transparency International, Chr Michelsen Institute, no date. 
97 With no formal mechanism for assigning cases, a handful of prosecutors typically distribute files 
among themselves. Crisis Group interview, additional public prosecutor, Dhaka, November 2015. 
98 Saira Islam Khan, op. cit. “Terror suspects off the hook”, Daily Star, 29 December 2015.  
99 The ordinance set up the government’s attorney department. Assistant prosecutors are paid 500 
taka (just over $6) per day, and an additional 2000 taka ($25.50) as a monthly honorarium.  
100 Crisis Group interview, additional public prosecutor, Dhaka, February 2016; “Judicial magis-
trates’ courts: case disposal drops to 50pc since 2009”, The New Age, 5 August 2015.  
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of respected retired judges and senior advocates, to scrutinise performance, including 
investigation gaps, trial delays and suspiciously high acquittal rates. 
D. Judicial Challenges 
1. Politicisation of the judiciary and provision of justice 
There are 1,700 judges in the lower courts, and 90 in the High Court.101 According to 
the Bangladesh Law Commission, 2.8 million cases were pending in 2014 in the lower 
judiciary and 325,000 in the High Court.102 The judiciary and law ministry have tak-
en a number of initiatives to ease the backlog, including encouraging out-of-court dis-
pute resolutions through the National Legal Aid Services Organisation; prioritising 
the disposal of cases more than ten years old or minor, such as traffic violations; and 
increasing the number of lower court judges.103 Yet, the backlog remains. In fact, the 
recent increase in judges has coincided with an increase in pending cases.104 
Several factors are responsible, including police investigators and prosecutors 
framing charges poorly, prosecutors failing to appear at proceedings or to produce 
witnesses, and judges issuing unnecessary adjournments and/or deliberately delay-
ing verdicts for political reasons.105 Meaningful progress will be unachievable without 
addressing the judiciary’s politicisation.  
While the 1972 constitution gave the Supreme Court full control of the lower judi-
ciary, the fourth amendment (1975) transferred that power to the president. “Since 
then, the government has maintained some form of control on the lower judiciary 
which continues till this day, despite the 1999 ruling”, said a senior Supreme Court 
advocate.106 In November 2007, the military-backed caretaker government amended 
four CrPC clauses to bring the lower judiciary under the Supreme Court’s purview.107 
Yet, the judiciary still lacks a separate secretariat, in effect leaving the law ministry 
in charge of recruitment, as well as transfers of and administrative action against low-
er court judges. Moreover, the 2009 Mobile Courts Act revived executive magistracy, 
which runs in parallel to the lower judiciary. 
 
 
101 In the two-tier court system, the magistrate and district sessions courts hear criminal cases at the 
lower level. Magistrate courts hear offences that carry a maximum seven-year sentence; sessions 
courts hear charges that carry stronger sentences, as well as appeals on magistrate court rulings. 
The Supreme Court has two divisions: a High Court bench, which hears appeals from lower courts 
and tribunals and has original jurisdiction in some limited cases; and an Appellate Division that 
hears appeals from the High Court. 
102 Bangladesh Law Commission recommendations on easing the backlog of ongoing trials in Bang-
ladeshi courts, 21 May 2014.  
103 Crisis group interview, Minister for Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs Anisul Huq, Dhaka 
16 January 2016. 
104 The AL-led government appointed 56 higher court judges during its previous term (2009-2014) 
and another ten judges during the current term. There are around three million cases pending in 
the courts, including 400,000 in the Supreme Court, according the law, justice and parliamentary 
affairs minister. Bangladesh Law Commission recommendations on easing the backlog, op. cit.; “10 
new Addl HC judges sworn in”, News Today, 13 February 2015; “Three million cases pending”, The 
Daily Star (editorial), 20 June 2015. 
105 “Timely Justice for all in Bangladesh: A Challenge for Change: Court processes, problems and 
solutions”, Supreme Court of Bangladesh and UNDP, 2015.  
106 Crisis Group interview, Dhaka, February 2016. The 1999 Supreme Court ruling called for sepa-
ration of the executive and judiciary. 
107 Masdar Hossain Case, Supreme Court Bar Association, www.bangladeshsupremecourtbar.com/ 
Masdar_Hossain_Case.php. 
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Executive interference in the judiciary is rampant. While ruling party members 
and supporters in effect remain above the law, with the police often refusing to file 
complaints against them, some use their political influence to push cases through 
the system for a price.108 Judges are harassed by prosecutors and have been trans-
ferred or threatened with administrative action by law ministry officials for granting 
bail to opposition activists or giving perceived adverse rulings in politically-sensitive 
cases.109 In January 2014, the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) initiated an inves-
tigation against a Dhaka sessions court judge two months after he had dismissed a 
money laundering case against BNP Vice Chairman Tarique Rahman for insufficient 
evidence. Facing government harassment, the judge fled the country.110  
Although the higher judiciary is ultimately responsible for departmental proceed-
ings against lower court judges, in the absence of a secretariat, the four-member 
general administration committee, chaired by the Supreme Court chief justice, is 
over-stretched and seldom defies or overturns an executive decision.111 Often, the 
law ministry will block a judge’s promotion by initiating a preliminary investigation 
on dubious grounds. Such practices, employed with increasing frequency, prompted 
the current chief justice in January 2016 to accuse the executive of “usurping the 
powers of the judiciary”.112 
However, the Supreme Court has not been beyond political influence. Past rul-
ings validating military rule undermined public and legal community confidence in 
its independence.113 Some of that legitimacy was regained when it declared military 
interventions unconstitutional.114 Yet, the Supreme Court validated the president’s 
imposition of a state of emergency and the installation of a military-controlled care-
taker government in November 2011.115 Under the current AL government, it has 
failed to prevent executive interference and politicisation of justice. Its January 2015 
ban, amid BNP protests, on media coverage of BNP Vice Chair Tarique Rahman is 
one manifestation of a partisan bench.116 The Supreme Court has also upheld all ICT 
death sentences and appears to be prioritising, over a long list of other death verdicts 
to be reviewed, examination of the death sentences of 152 members of the Bangla-
desh Rifles (BDR) for their role in a revolt against the AL government in February 
2009.117 Those sentenced for less politically-charged crimes typically spend more 
than a decade on death row before their appeals are heard.118 
 
 
108 Saira Rahman Khan, op. cit. 
109 Crisis Group interviews, district sessions court judge, December 2015; legal community, October-
December 2015. 
110 “Ex-judge now living in Malaysia”, The Daily Star, 23 January 2014; “ACC summons Bashundhara 
Group official”, The Daily Star, 28 January 2014.  
111 Crisis Group interview, Supreme Court lawyer, Dhaka, October 2015.  
112 “Govt wants to snatch all power of judiciary”, Prothom Alo, 10 January 2016. 
113 Crisis Group interview, National Human Rights Commission, Dhaka, December 2015.  
114 “The Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act’s Case 2006”, The Bangladesh Law Times (special 
issue). In August 2010, the Supreme Court’s High Court division declared General Hussain Muham-
mad Ershad’s martial law and the Seventh Amendment that validated it unconstitutional, a decision 
upheld by the Appellate Division in May 2011. Siddique Ahmed (appellant) versus Government of 
Bangladesh and Others (respondents), civil appeal no. 48 of 2011. 
115 Crisis Group Report, Mapping Bangladesh’s Political Crisis, op. cit. 
116 “Bangladesh media ban for opposition leader Khaleda Zia’s son”, BBC News, 7 January 2015. 
117 “Nearly 1,200 SC prisoners await SC verdict”, The New Age, 19 December 2015; “Bangladesh to 
execute 152 soldiers for mutiny crimes”, BBC News, 5 November 2013. 
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2. Judicial appointments 
The president appoints additional judges for a two-year probationary period on the 
prime minister’s (binding) advice and in consultation with the Supreme Court’s chief 
justice.119 The president may confirm permanent appointments on the chief justice’s 
advice. Yet, the prime minister has the key role, largely ignoring higher court judg-
ments calling for meaningful consultation with the chief justice. As a result, there are 
additional judges with clear political leanings or who are not inclined to challenge 
the government before their confirmation. Junior judges on division benches are also 
largely viewed as government sympathisers who give favourable rulings.120  
During its 2001-2006 tenure, the BNP government stacked the bench with loyal-
ists, including by appointing nineteen additional judges to the High Court division 
just before the Supreme Court’s 2004 summer recess. The AL made this politicisa-
tion an electoral issue. Once in office, however, Sheikh Hasina, similarly appointed 
judges without meaningfully consulting the chief justice and on political grounds.121 
The minimum requirement for a Supreme Court appointment is ten years of bar 
membership, without accounting for active service, or ten years as a lower court 
judge. In practice, appointments favour partisan lawyers with no experience in writ-
ing judgements over experienced lower court judges at an estimated 90:10 ratio. A 
former Supreme Court registrar argued that active lower court judges are sometimes 
more qualified than higher court peers.122 Some of the latter, unable to properly draft 
verdicts, have tended to publish detailed judgments after their retirement – a prac-
tice the chief justice described (out of court) as unconstitutional.123 Around 550 
higher court verdicts and orders have yet to be given in written judgments.124  
A 2014 law commission proposal called for the government to set minimum 
active-service requirements for appointment of lawyers and lower court judges to 
the Supreme Court.125 Retired Supreme Court justices have recommended that law-
yers and serving lower court judges be appointed in equal proportion to ensure a 
sufficient number of experienced judges in the higher courts.126 Quality must, how-
ever, be accompanied by institutional independence. In September 2014, the AL-
dominated parliament passed the sixteenth constitutional amendment, restoring 
legislative authority to impeach judges, which had been vested in the three-member 
Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) headed by the chief justice. The AL’s track record of 
partisan appointments and propensity to curb opposition and dissent have raised 
justified concerns about its intentions. Judges facing the prospect of parliamentary 
impeachment may be even less inclined to challenge executive action.  
The chief justice’s increasingly frequent and public criticisms of the government’s 
conduct reflect frustrations within the judiciary and legal community about execu-
tive overreach.127 Bar and bench should channel such sentiments into demands to 
 
 
119 Section 95, constitution. 
120 Crisis Group interviews, Supreme Court advocates, October-December 2015.  
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122 Crisis Group interview, Dhaka, December 2015.  
123 “Bangabhaban meet resolves to skip controversy”, Prothom Alo, 30 January 2016. 
124 “Three retd SC judges yet to write 550 orders”, The New Age, 27 January 2016. 
125 Bangladesh Law Commission recommendations on legislating the appointment of Supreme 
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enforce the constitutional requirement for an independent judiciary. A first step 
should be a more transparent, consultative judicial appointment process, based on 
consultations with the bar councils and followed by parliamentary endorsement. 
E. Parallel Justice 
If the regular judicial process is problematic, the establishment of special tribunals 
and other parallel processes pose additional hurdles to the delivery of justice. The 
2002 Speedy Tribunal Act set a 120-day limit for completion of trial in cases the law 
ministry selects for quick dispensation. But the selections tend to be made on politi-
cal grounds, such as for the 21 August 2004 grenade attack case in which BNP Vice 
Chairman Tarique Rahman is currently on trial in absentia.128 In August 2015, a 
Dhaka special court held almost weekly hearings on an embezzlement case that 
could see BNP leader Khaleda Zia imprisoned for life.129 Proceedings continue on 
another case, in which Zia is accused of causing the state a loss of nearly 138 billion 
taka (almost $2 million) in awarding contracts to a Canadian energy company. The 
High Court quashed an almost identical charge in 2010 against Prime Minister 
Hasina for awarding contracts to the same company.130  
There are other special tribunals, including for offences under the Special Powers 
Act.131 Many have timeframes under which a trial is to be completed but standards 
for admission of evidence, including video and social media, that regular courts do 
not recognise. The result is a justice system that swings between two extremes: a 
woefully slow and dysfunctional process for ordinary cases and a speedy process that 
undermines due process in politically-charged ones. 
Arguably the most consequential and controversial parallel process is the ICT’s, 
established in 2010 under the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973 to prose-
cute Bangladeshis who committed atrocities in collusion with the Pakistani military 
during the 1971 liberation war. The ICT has convicted 24 of war crimes, most of 
them prominent opposition leaders, while ignoring accusations of atrocities by pro-
independence militias against pro-Pakistan elements, including against the Bihari 
community.132 The ICT Act dispenses with technical rules under the Evidence Act; 
does away with standards of witness testimony under the CrPC; and makes no men-
tion of the burden of evidence for conviction. A lawyer involved in the defence of a 
person convicted of war crimes said, “it is virtually impossible to defend anybody 
under this law”, a view echoed by many prominent domestic and foreign experts.133 
In August 2013, ICT prosecutors charged Human Rights Watch with contempt in 
a still open case after it described the trial of former Jamaat head Ghulam Azam as 
“deeply flawed”, citing credible reports of “collusion and bias among prosecutors and 
 
 
128 Since September 2008, Rahman has been in self-exile in London. 
129 “Tarique was involved in Aug 21 grenade attack”, The Daily Star, 16 December 2015; “Increasing 
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130 Crisis Group interview, Barrister Moudud Ahmed, former law minister and BNP standing com-
mittee member, Dhaka, December 2015.  
131 There are also special anti-terrorism tribunals and special tribunals for women and child repres-
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132 Geoffrey Robertson Q.C., “Report on the International Crimes Tribunal”, International Forum 
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judges”.134 In April 2014, the ICT charged a Dhaka-based British journalist, David 
Bergman, with contempt after he questioned in a blog aspects of the proceedings, 
including exaggerated claims of numbers killed in the liberation war. He was con-
victed on 2 December 2014. In April 2015, the tribunal initiated contempt proceed-
ings against 23 of 49 signatories of an earlier statement criticising the Bergman ver-
dict, after exonerating those who had apologised.135 In a major ruling later that month, 
the Supreme Court’s High Court Division ruled that those convicted of contempt by 
the ICT have a constitutional right to take the case to the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court, contrary to the ICT act.136 This may open some space for criticism 
and dissent. 
F. Silencing Civil Society  
Bringing the perpetrators of recent jihadist attacks to justice through a transparent 
legal process will be important to bolstering public confidence in the state’s ability to 
contain resurgent extremism. An impartial and effective criminal justice system 
could also help defuse political tensions between the AL and BNP and restore politi-
cal stability by checking state excesses, rejecting politicised trials and, by ensuring 
fair dispute resolution in court, removing the opposition’s incentive to seek violent 
resolution on the streets. Yet, reforming the criminal justice system at the very least 
requires government and opposition to acknowledge the importance of shoring up 
the rule of law. Instead, the government appears bent on using the law enforcement 
machinery and its hold over parliament to silence legitimate dissent and criticism. 
Freedom of expression and civil liberties are under assault, with restrictions on 
the media reaching proportions that are unprecedented and alarming, at least under 
a democratically elected government.137 The secretary of the prominent human rights 
NGO, Odhikar, is currently on trial for contradicting the official number of casualties 
during the 2013 Hefazat rally, while the organisation’s foreign funds are frozen.138 In 
2013, parliament amended the Information and Communication Technology Act, 
placing new restrictions on online expression. Hundreds of politicians and private 
citizens, including academics, have been tried or charged for views expressed on Face-
book or for posting or sharing “derogatory” images, though the law does not clearly 
define “derogatory”.139  
The 2014 national broadcast policy – announced amid widespread media con-
demnation of RAB abuses – called for prohibiting content contrary to the “public 
interest”, undermining the reputation of the army and law enforcement agencies or 
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harming relations with “friendly countries”.140 While the government called the pro-
visions merely “guidelines” with no mechanism for enforcement or punishment, they 
carry high potential for abuse.141 Even before the policy’s formulation, the govern-
ment had forced several television channels to close, including Channel One, Dig-
anta TV and Islamic TV (for live coverage of the 2013 Hefazat rally), and Ekushay TV 
(subsequently resurrected under new ownership) for live broadcast of a speech by 
Tarique Rahman. Ekushay TV’s former owner has been imprisoned since January 
2015, convicted for pornography and sedition.142 
The print media confronts similar challenges. The Bangla-language daily Amar 
Desh shut down and its owner and acting editor, Mahmudur Rahman, has been 
detained since April 2013 on charges including defamation, sedition and corruption, 
after a story alleging corruption of the prime minister’s son and ICT adviser, Sajeeb 
Wazed Joy. In January 2014, following reporting critical of the government, the of-
fices of another vernacular newspaper, Inqilab, were raided, its press closed and four 
journalists arrested for publishing “false” and “misleading” information. The leading 
Bangla and English dailies, Prothom Alo and Daily Star, have come under intelli-
gence agency pressure, along with calls by AL parliamentarians and leaders, includ-
ing Prime Minister Hasina’s son Joy, for the trial of Daily Star editor Mahfuz Anam 
and closure of the newspaper, after he admitted, during a January 2016 talk show, to 
having published uncorroborated corruption allegations against Sheikh Hasina in 
2008, during the military-backed caretaker government. AL activists have filed over 
60 criminal defamation and at least seventeen sedition cases against him.143  
Right to dissent was a major factor underlying Bangladesh’s independence strug-
gle. Upholding it is as important now, if political stability is to be restored. Suppres-
sion of free expression in a nation with a long tradition of political activism has 
often, including in recent years, provoked violent reaction and lethal confrontation 
between government and opposition. Such crises have strained state resources, while 
undermining the legitimacy of the government and standing of the law enforcement 
agencies and judiciary in the eyes of the public.  
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VI. International Engagement 
While Bangladesh may not be a priority in the regional policies of most influential 
international actors, a growing recognition of the links between a dysfunctional 
polity and rising extremism is refocusing attention on its domestic challenges. The 
ability of outside actors to steer an AL-BNP rapprochement is limited, but the coun-
try’s major financial and development partners, particularly the U.S. and EU, could 
still usefully push for a broader reform agenda, particularly in the context of civil 
and political rights, that might help steer the country onto the path of stability. The 
political instability, criminal violence and extremism have more immediate security 
implications for neighbouring India. With a long history of engagement with Bang-
ladesh, it is possibly best positioned to influence political dynamics, if willing to 
pressure its traditional AL ally to mend fences with the BNP.  
As Bangladesh’s largest export market, the U.S. has used financial leverage, par-
ticularly through engagement with the AL government on labour rights. It suspend-
ed Dhaka’s eligibility for tariff benefits under the Generalised System of Preferences 
(GSP) in June 2013, following the April 2013 Rana Plaza collapse that killed over 
1,100 people, mostly workers. While the AL government has yet to implement all 
recommended measures to improve labour conditions, attempts to persuade Wash-
ington to restore GSP benefits are translating into some steps forward.144 Moving 
beyond the discussion about labour standards, the U.S. should signal that perfor-
mance on free speech, fair trials and human rights more broadly will determine 
whether and with what speed it will restore the GSP facility. The EU, a large export 
market, especially for readymade garments, is also a major development partner and 
could link some of its aid to improvements in human rights, free speech, fair trials 
and respect for the rights of the political opposition more broadly  
The U.S., EU and its member states should also engage with India, which has 
sway on both sides of Bangladesh’s political divide and reportedly was important in 
encouraging reduction of violence in early 2015.145 Extracting guarantees and follow-
through from Dhaka on its primary security interest – a stable border region that 
does not again become a sanctuary for anti-Indian and other militant groups – it 
has expanded economic, cultural and people-to-people ties with its smaller neigh-
bour.146 An unstable Bangladesh unable to slow the growth of jihadist networks 
would undermine India’s economic and security interests. In the absence of a major 
crisis, however, New Delhi has been reluctant to involve itself in internal politics. 
Yet, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government should realise AL refusal to accept 
legitimate political opposition, could trigger a major confrontation that would bene-
fit spoilers, including radical extremists. Exploiting its close relationship to the AL 
government and bolstered further by the Indian parliament’s 2015 ratification of the 
1974 Land Boundary Agreement, New Delhi should insist on a level political playing 
field.147  
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VII. Conclusion 
Politicised justice and violence have increasingly become inseparable in Bangladesh. 
The polity’s deep polarisation, exacerbated by the BNP’s 2014 electoral boycott and the 
AL government’s refusal to accept legitimate criticism, have led to political impasse. 
Addressing the law and order challenges requires the AL and BNP to lower tensions 
to levels that ensure basic internal stability. 
The BNP’s apparent decision to re-enter the political mainstream is a welcome 
departure from its obstructionist agenda a year ago. It provides an opening for dia-
logue between government and opposition that could end the zero-sum game that 
has held the county and citizens hostage to a longstanding political feud. It is in 
the AL’s interest to accept the BNP’s decision to work within the constitutional and 
political order. Should Sheikh Hasina fail to do so, her government could be a loser, 
a realisation that is increasingly accepted by some in both parties.148 For a start, the 
government should end the use of a politicised law enforcement and judicial appa-
ratus against the opposition. Otherwise, the targeting of critics and resort to ram-
pant human rights abuses, with their potential to spark a return of political violence, 
will also continue to provide grist to the jihadists’ propaganda mill.  
By suppressing a secular civil society, the AL is alienating what was historically a 
key constituency. This has significant ramifications for its future. Despite many legal 
and political challenges, the BNP still enjoys a popular base. Should it opt for peace-
ful opposition while the government continues to suppress dissent, the AL would 
likely bear the blame for worsening social and political divisions. As in the past, the 
arbitrary legal provisions and instruments the government has introduced could also 
be used against it in a subsequent dispensation. If so, a change in government would 
simply add another chapter to, rather than turn the page on, the political crisis.  
While the onus of breaking this cycle rests with the AL government, an independ-
ent justice system could become vital, as a neutral arbiter. An impartial judiciary 
that protects constitutional freedoms, including of association and free speech, courts 
that provide access to justice instead of acting as instruments of the executive, and 
police who focus on combatting criminality, including violent extremism, while also 
protecting all citizens would give the opposition the level playing field essential for a 
resumed, meaningful dialogue with the government. Civil society stakeholders, par-
ticularly the legal community, also have an important role to play in defusing politi-
cal tensions by checking the government’s excesses, protecting fundamental rights 
and reviving rule of law.  
Brussels, 11 April 2016 
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Appendix A: Map of Bangladesh 
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Appendix B: Glossary 
AL Awami League, currently the ruling party, led by Prime Minister  
Sheikh Hasina Wajid.  
AQIS  al-Qaeda in the Subcontinent. 
BNP  Bangladesh National Party, led by former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia.  
CID Criminal Investigation Department.  
CrPC Code of Criminal Procedure. 
GSP Generalised System of Preferences.  
Hartal Strike.  
HUJI-B Harkatul Jihad Al Islami-Bangladesh, an anti-India jihadist group.  
ICT International Crimes Tribunal, prosecuting cases of atrocities committed 
during the 1971 liberation war. 
IS Islamic State. 
JMB  Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh, Bangladesh’s most prominent  
jihadist group.  
JMJB Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh, an extremist group. 
PBI Police Bureau of Investigation. 
RAB Rapid Action Battalion, an elite paramilitary force. 
 
